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COMMENTS
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
AND OTHER PROTECTIONS
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
IN FEDERAL TAX INVESTIGATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The assertion of the right against self-incrimination by persons sub-
jected to a federal tax investigation has presented a difficult factual con-
text for the development of the fifth amendment.' This comment will
examine the effect of our pervasive scheme of taxation and its attendant
power to conduct civil investigations on the ability of the taxpayer to
preserve his right against self-incrimination in a criminal tax case.
Criminal tax investigations center on proof of an intentional attempt
to circumvent the income tax laws. The willful attempt to evade or de-
feat any tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code is a felony.2 In
addition, a taxpayer who willfully fails to pay a tax or estimated tax,
make a return, keep records, or supply records when he is required to
do so by the Code may be guilty of a misdemeanor.3 Inherent in the
criminal statutes is the requirement that the Internal Revenue Service
demonstrate an actual tax liability on the part of the taxpayer, i.e., prove
that he owed a tax which he has not paid or that he has earned suffi-
cient income to require the filing of a return which he has not filed. It is
this necessity of proving a civil tax liability which forges the relationship
between the criminal tax investigation and the civil audit.
To prove a violation of the tax laws in a criminal case, the Service will
need to obtain a significant amount of information not contained on the
usual tax return. Often it will want to discover information solely within
the knowledge or possession of the taxpayer or those with a close rela-
tionship to him. Much of this information will be of the type normally
considered to be private or confidential, e.g., bank records, canceled
checks, receipts, records of personal expenses, and similar items. A tax-
payer who has been fully apprised of his potential criminal liability may
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. I.R.C. § 7201.
3. Id. § 7203. I.R.C. § 6012 defines those persons required to make income
tax returns. Note that individuals required to file declarations of estimated in-
come tax liability by I.R.C. § 6015 are exempted from § 7203 sanctions if they
fail to file.
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not be willing to surrender these documents voluntarily. To acquire such
information, the Service may obtain a search warrant; once a criminal
prosecution has been begun or recommended, this may be the only
means available. 4 However, because of the common element of tax lia-
bility, a criminal tax investigation is often contemporaneous with or pre-
ceded by a civil audit. The investigative procedures which are available
in a civil audit but not in a criminal investigation 5 may be valuable in
obtaining the information necessary to obtain a criminal conviction.
In order to determine civil tax liability, the Secretary of the Treasury
is empowered to issue a summons to the taxpayer or to any other person
he deems proper to testify under oath or produce records relating to
that liability. 6 The United States district court for the district in which
such person resides or is found has jurisdiction to compel compliance
with the summons.7 If that person "contumaciously" refuses to obey the
summons, the court may order his arrest and, after a hearing, punish
him as for contempt.'
It is clear that information obtained by means of a civil summons may
be used in a criminal case against the subject of the summons unless
there is a ground for excluding such evidence. 9 This comment will deal
with the possibilities of preventing the Service from obtaining incriminat-
ing evidence by means of a civil summons and of excluding incriminat-
ing evidence obtained during a civil investigation. Specifically, three
areas will be examined: 10 (1) the necessity for a cautionary warning
such as that required by Miranda v. Arizona I when a taxpayer is ques-
tioned by Service investigators; (2) the ability of a taxpayer to assert suc-
cessfully the right against self-incrimination as a bar to a civil summons
to produce documents or give testimony; and (3) the right of a taxpayer
to assert common law privileges such as the attorney/client and
husband/wife privileges in federal tax investigations.
II. THE NECESSITY OF A CAUTIONARY WARNING
IN CRIMINAL TAX INVESTIGATIONS
A. Constitutional Requirements
In Miranda v. Arizona 12 the United States Supreme Court held that the
prosecution could not introduce into evidence statements of the defend-
4. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
5. Id.
6. I.R.C. § 7602.
7. I.R.C. § 7604(a).
8. I.R.C. § 7604(b); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 448 (1964).
9. United States v. Esser, 520 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1975).
10. A discussion of the taxpayer's right not to file a return disclosing illegal
sources of income is not within the scope of this comment. See United States v.
Oliver, 505 F.2d 301, 307-08 (7th Cir. 1974).
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ant made during a custodial interrogation unless it demonstrated that
procedural safeguards to protect the defendant's right against self-
incrimination were followed. 3 The prosecution was required to show
that the defendant had been warned that he had the right to remain
silent, that any statement he made could be used as evidence against
him, and that he had the right to the presence of an attorney, either
appointed or retained, during questioning.14 The Court held that the
warning must be given when the defendant is first taken into "custody at
the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any signifi-
cant way." 15
A problem arises in attempting to determine the point in a tax investi-
gation at which the Miranda warning must be given. It is difficult to
draw parallels between the traditional police investigation dealt with by
the Court in Miranda and the typical criminal tax investigation in which
the line between civil and criminal liability is blurred and in which the
suspect is rarely taken into custody.' 6
The Seventh Circuit attempted to deal with this problem by devising a
test based on the language in Miranda requiring a warning whenever the
defendant is "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." 17 In United States v. Dickerson 18 and United States v. Oliver 9 the
court held that the dual civil/criminal nature of a tax investigation may
create three key misapprehensions in the mind of the taxpayer: (1) a
misapprehension as to the nature of the inquiry; (2) a misapprehension
as to his obligation to respond; and (3) a misapprehension as to the con-
sequences of his response.20 The court stated that once the Service has
commenced preparation of its criminal case by assigning the matter to its
Intelligence Division, any questioning of the taxpayer without informing
him of the potential for criminal liability will create these misapprehen-
sions. The practical effect is to place the taxpayer under a psychological
compulsion to testify similar to that experienced by a suspect during cus-
todial interrogation; he is deprived of his freedom of action in a signifi-
cant way and must be given the cautionary warning required by
Miranda .21
13. Id. at 444.
14. Id. at 467-75.
15. Id. at 477.
16. United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 8 (1st Cir. 1970). It should be stated
at this point that only criminal tax investigations are discussed in this section. No
contention is made that a Miranda warning is required in a civil audit situation
which does not result in a prosecution for violation of the tax law.
17. 384 U.S. at 477.
18. 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
19. 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974).
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The Supreme Court rejected the psychological compulsion test in
Beckwith v. United States 2 2 and held that no Miranda warning was re-
quired if the interrogation was not custodial. The Court interpreted the
phrase in Miranda "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way" 23 as requiring compulsion based on a restraint of physi-
cal freedom of movement. This reading ascribes no meaning to the "de-
privation" language in Miranda 'beyond that already encompassed in the
notion of "custody," and thus renders the term of little import.
In Beckwith the defendant was interrogated in a private home, and in
his own office. The Court held that he was not in custody and that a
warning was not necessary. The difficulty with this approach lies in the
nature of a criminal tax investigation. It differs in a number of ways
from the regular criminal investigations conducted by police. First, un-
like the police suspect, the taxpayer under scrutiny by the Service is
rarely taken into custody. Second, the police know what crime has been
committed and in their investigation are searching for a culprit. In con-
trast, the Service knows the identity of the wrongdoer; the investigation
is to discover which crime he committed. In this way a criminal tax in-
vestigation focuses on a suspect much earlier than an investigation con-
ducted by the police. Third, the dual civil/criminal purpose of tax inves-
tigations affords an opportunity for improper coordination between the
Service's civil audit and intelligence (criminal) divisions which does not
exist in police work. By the time an agent of the Intelligence Division
places a taxpayer in physical custody, the case against that taxpayer may
be virtually complete; it has often been built with the taxpayer's own
incriminating disclosures. In addition, it is not clear that the taxpayer
must be informed of the possibility of criminal charges when he answers
questions or supplies documents in the course of a civil audit.24
The Court acknowledged in Beckwith that the purpose of the warnings
required by Miranda is to counteract the compulsion inherent in custo-
dial surroundings. 2 5 Miranda was based on the need for special
safeguards in the case of "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in
a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating state-
ments without full warnings of constitutional rights." 26  However, the
Court failed to recognize that there may be situations involving a signifi-
cant restraint on the taxpayer's physical freedom of movement short of
custody which fall within the ambit of the Miranda rationale. In Oliver
the taxpayer was questioned in a federal building and was prevented
from receiving communications from his attorney. The Seventh Circuit
22. 425 U.S. 341 (1976). In dissent, Justice Brennan indicated that he would
have applied the psychological compulsion test developed by the Seventh Circuit.
23. 384 U.S. at 477.
24. United States v. Presley, 478 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1973).
25. 425 U.S. at 345-46.
26. 384 U.S. at 445.
670 '[Vol. 43
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indicated that although the taxpayer was not in custody, there was evi-
dence of a significant deprivation of his freedom of action. 27
In United States v. Lackey 28 the taxpayers were instructed to report to a
post office for questioning. They were not informed that they could re-
fuse to attend or that they were entitled to have an attorney present.
The questioning took place in a small, starkly furnished room in the
basement of the building. The only windows were near the ceiling and,
with one minor exception, the door to the room remained closed
throughout the three hour interrogation. The taxpayers were placed
under oath and the interview was recorded on tape. The court held that
this was a significant deprivation of the taxpayer's freedom of action and
that the cautionary warning required by Miranda should have been
given.
These situations would seem to present the elements of an incom-
municado interrogation conducted in an official-dominated, if not
police-dominated, atmosphere discussed in Miranda. Not to require a
cautionary warning in such cases violates the purpose of Miranda. How-
ever, the Court in Beckwith conditioned the necessity of a warning on a
single factor-custody. Non-custody cases, the Court stated, are to be
analyzed only in terms of the voluntariness of the statement. The fact
that warnings are or are not given would only be evidence concerning
coerciveness. In this regard the Court took a simplistic and unwarranted
view of Miranda. Beckwith rejected the "psychological compulsion" test
developed in Dickerson 29 and adopted instead a standard of compulsion
based on physical custody. The Court in Beckwith apparently failed to
recognize that custodial compulsion is also largely psychological in na-
ture.30 The central question should be what circumstances produce the
requisite degree of psychological compulsion. In view of the Court's
holding in Beckwith, it may be impossible to require a Miranda-type warn-
ing in any criminal tax investigation. 3 1
27. In United States v. Dreske, 536 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1976), the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged that Beckwith "undermines" Dickerson and Oliver but indi-
cated that those cases have not been overruled. The court in Dreske did not base
its decision to affirm the denial of a motion to strike evidence obtained in a
taxpayer interview on Beckwith, despite the fact that the case appears to be di-
rectly applicable. Instead, the court explained that Dickerson and Oliver apply only
when an investigation has been transferred to the Service's Intelligence Division(the branch responsible for criminal investigation) and not whenever investiga-
tion focuses on a subject. However, the court did cite Beckwith as an additional
ground for affirmance.
28. 413 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1969).
29. 413 F.2d at 1116.
30. The Supreme Court in Miranda states, "Again we stress that the modern
practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically
oriented." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966).
31. On occasion the mechanical test of custody which the Supreme Court
appears to be developing for tax cases may work in favor of the taxpayer. In
5
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B. Administratively Required Warning
Even when the Miranda warning is not required, the taxpayer still may
be afforded some protection by administratively required warnings and
by fifth amendment standards of voluntariness. The Service has re-
quired agents employed by the Intelligence Division, which has responsi-
bility for criminal matters, to give a cautionary warning whenever they
conduct an interview, even if the person interviewed is not in custody. If
an agent fails to follow these guidelines, at least one court has held that
the evidence so obtained must be excluded. 32 The rationale is that ex-
Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), the taxpayer was an inmate of the
state penitentiary confined as a result of a conviction in a non-tax case. An agent
of the civil audit department visited the taxpayer in prison and questioned him
about his tax liability. This interview led to a criminal investigation and prosecu-
tion for tax fraud. The Court reversed the conviction because the agent had not
given the taxpayer a Miranda warning before questioning him. The Service
claimed that the warning was not required because the taxpayer was not in the
custody of the agent conducting the interview. The Court rejected both conten-
tions and held that whenever the taxpayer is in custody, the warning must be
given. If Miranda is based on the compulsion to respond generated by custodial
surroundings, it is questionable who is under greater pressure to answer ques-
tions in an attempt to exculpate himself, the prisoner in Mathis interrogated "at
home" in the penitentiary, or the businessman questioned in the office of an
agent for the Internal Revenue Service. The Supreme Court has recognized in
non-tax cases that custody may occur outside a police station. See, e.g., Orozco v.
Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (murder suspect interrogated in a bedroom).
In United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415, 419 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1021 (1971), the court held that custody is a prerequisite to the Miranda
warning, and that custody was not present when the taxpayer was interrogated.
However, the court recognized in dictum that a taxpayer may be subjected to an
in-custody interrogation outside a police station. But see United States v. Venditti,
533 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1976) (noncustodial, noncoercive interview with a tax
technician); United States v. Pholman, 510 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1975) (attorney
interviewed in her office); United States v. Bettenhausen, 499 F.2d 1223 (10th
Cir. 1974) (taxpayer taken upstairs and down hallways to an inside room of gov-
ernment building); White v. United States, 395 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1968) (inter-
view conducted on business premises of taxpayer). In these cases the Miranda
warning was not required.
32. United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7.(lst Cir. 1970). Leahey was based on
the assumption by the First Circuit that a failure to give the warning would in
some way deny the accused his right to due process, apparently either by remov-
ing a procedural safeguard or by misleading the accused as to its existence.
However, because these warnings are not required by the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment but only by an administrative rule, it is not clear
how a failure to supply the warning rises to a constitutional question.
United States v. Jacobs, 531 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S.
909 (1976), suggests another possible basis for exclusion. The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's exclusion of testimony given by defendant before a
grand jury and dismissal of a perjury count based on that testimony. The defen-
dant had been summoned to testify before a grand jury by the Organized Crime
Strike Force without being informed that she was the target of an investigation.
The Second Circuit found that it was the universal practice among other pros-
672 [Vol. 43
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clusion of the evidence will insure compliance with the guidelines by the
agents, and that because of the publicity given to the guidelines, not to
require compliance would mislead the public.
The administratively required warning is similar but not identical to
the warning required by Miranda.3 Unlike the Miranda requirements,
however, under which the prosecution must demonstrate the use of pro-
cedural safeguards to protect the defendant's right against self-incrimi-
nation, 34 the burden is on the taxpayer to prove a violation of adminis-
trative procedures and to show that the violation was prejudicial to him.
In addition, the focus in the administrative context is on whether there
was a substantial omission.35 Therefore, the protection provided by the
administratively required warnings is less than that provided by the
Miranda warning required for an in-custody interrogation. This is a ra-
tional distinction so long as the taxpayer has not been subjected to any
compulsion to incriminate himself. Absent compulsion, it should be
sufficient protection to inform the taxpayer of his potential criminal lia-
bility and of his rights to remain silent and to obtain the assistance of
counsel.
C. Voluntariness
Another potential source for protection of taxpayers subjected to crim-
inal tax investigations is the fifth amendment voluntariness requirement.
Voluntariness is a requirement for admission of statements made by the
defendant in a criminal case. When the prophylactic procedural
safeguards mandated by Miranda are not applicable, the prosecution
must show by the totality of the circumstances surrounding the state-
ment it seeks to admit that the will of the defendant was not overborne
and hence the statement was given voluntarily. 36 Two cases from the
ecutors in the circuit to inform a witness called before a grand jury if he or she
was a subject of investigation in accordance with § 3.6(d) of the ABA PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE FUNCTION (Approved Draft 1971). The court held that such disparity was
outside the "penumbra of fair play," and affirmed the dismissal pursuant to its
supervisory function over the district courts in the interest of uniformity of crim-
inal procedure within the circuit.
The Supreme Court vacated the opinion and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976), a case
dealing with the constitutional right to a Miranda warning when testifying before
a grand jury. The Court did this despite the fact that the Second Circuit ex-
pressly stated that its decision was based on its discretionary supervisory power
and not on a constitutional basis. See 425 U.S. at 910 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. IRS Release (November 26, 1968); IRS Release (October 3, 1967).
34. 384 U.S. at 444.
35. See generally Note, Extending Miranda to Administrative Investigations, 56 VA.
L. REv. 690 (1970).
36. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976). See also Iver-
son v. North Dakota, 480 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1973). This was a murder case in
673
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Third Circuit 37 have indicated that this voluntariness test is to be
applied in all criminal tax cases.
38
Traditional forms of coercion, e.g., threats of physical violence or
harm to friends or relatives, may be rare in tax investigations. However,
it is possible that a statement could be rendered involuntary by decep-
tion on the part of the investigators. In United States v. Robson,3 9 a case
decided on fourth amendment search and seizure grounds, 40 the court
stated that if an agent affirmatively misleads a taxpayer into believing
that an investigation is exclusively civil when it is not, this deception may
vitiate the taxpayer's consent to a search of his records and render the
search unreasonable. However, merely failing to inform the taxpayer
that the investigation may have potential criminal consequences will not
make the search unreasonable. By analogy, a deception which rises to
the level of affirmative trickery concerning the very nature of the inves-
tigation should be sufficient to justify a finding that the will of the ac-
cused was overborne. Any statement made while laboring under such a
misapprehension should be considered involuntary.
III. THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
AS A BAR TO A CIVIL SUMMONS
Information obtained by the Service pursuant to a legitimate civil
audit may be used in a subsequent criminal tax prosecution. 41  There-
fore, the taxpayer who suspects potential criminal liability 42 may wish to
which the defendant was interrogated in a police station for twenty minutes
without being taken into custody. The defendant was told by the state's attorney
that he could not refuse to answer questions. The court held that in the normal
case this would not be enough to overbear the will but remanded for a determi-
nation whether the the disputed competency of the defendant may have resulted
in his will being overborne by this tactic.
37. United States v. Nemetz, 450 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v.
Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971).
38. This position, which is stated more clearly in Nemetz, is of doubtful valid-
ity in light of Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968). Apparently, the Nemetz
court meant only that the Miranda warnings are not required when custody is
absent, as it is in the majority of tax cases. InJaskiewicz the court recognized that
noncustodial compulsion may rise to a level which renders a statement involun-
tary. 433 F.2d at 420.
39. 477 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1973).
40. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
41. United States v. Esser, 520 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1975). The Service's ability
to investigate under I.R.C. § 7602 is not limited to situations in which there is
probable cause to believe that the tax laws have been violated. "The purpose of
the statutes is not to accuse, but to inquire." United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S.
141, 146 (1975).
42. If the taxpayer already faces criminal prosecution, a motion to suppress
evidence obtained by the use of a summons presents another possible context in
which the fifth amendment privilege might be raised.
(Vol. 43674
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refuse to comply with a summons issued by the Service. 43 Refusals to
provide information or attempts to suppress evidence have focused on
two different but interrelated issues: a pure fifth amendment approach,
and an attempt to show that the summons does not meet the statutory
requirements. Both issues deal with protection of the right against self-
incrimination, and the courts have not always made a clear delineation
between them.
A. Constitutional Objections
In the pure fifth amendment context, the test centers on possession
and the testimonial nature of the documents or other information
sought by the summons. 44 In Fisher v. United States 45 the Service sought
43. Taxpayers have generally been unsuccessful in attempts to avoid liability
for failing to file a tax return by claiming that to do so would violate their fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination by disclosing illegally obtained in-
come. Oliver v. United States, 505 F.2d 301, 307-08 (7th Cir. 1974) rejected an
application of Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) to federal tax re-
turns. Unlike the statute involved in Marchetti, the income tax law is directed to
the public at large. Its demand for information is neutral in that it requires both
legal and illegal income to be reported, and it is supported by legitimate policy
considerations, i.e., collecting tax revenues, which are unrelated to the compul-
sion to disclose incriminating evidence. But see Comment, Reporting Illegal Gains
As Taxable Income: A Compromise Solution To A Prosecutorial Windfall, 69 Nw. U.L.
REv. 111 (1974).
44. In those situations in which a fifth amendment right does exist, it is a
personal right. It cannot be claimed by a partner to prevent enforcement of a
summons seeking partnership records, even if thoie records will incriminate the
parther who has possession of them and to whom the summons is directed. Bellis
v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974). Nor may the officer of a corporation, even
a Subchapter S corporation, assert a fifth amendment right as a basis for refus-
ing to deliver corporate records which incriminate him. United States v. Mid-
West Business Forms, Inc., 474 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Richardson, 469 F.2d 349 (10th Cir. 1972).
This limitation on the right applies only to the production of documents. It
does not apply to a summons directing a taxpayer partner to appear and testify.
In United States v. Mahady & Mahady, 512 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1975), the client of
a law firm was under investigation by the Service. The client waived the
attorney/client privilege, but the attorney partners still refused to testify or to
deliver documents pursuant to the summons, claiming that to do so might in-
criminate them. The court held that they had to produce the documents but
could not be compelled to testify. As to testimony, the right against self-
incrimination extends even where the respondent to the summons is not the
subject of criminal investigation. The attorneys' answers might have formed a
link in a chain leading to a criminal conviction and they could not be compelled
to forge that link. Id. at 524.
Rather than making a simple dichotomy between documents and "testimony,"
it might prove fruitful to argue for or against the enforcement of a summons
based on the testimonial nature of whatever evidence is sought. See text accom-
panying notes 48-51 infra.
45. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
1978] 675
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items used by the taxpayer's accountant in preparing the taxpayer's re-
turns and directed the summons at the taxpayer's attorney who was in
possession of the documents. The taxpayer intervened in the proceeding
brought by the Service to enforce the summons after the attorney re-
fused to deliver the papers. 46 The taxpayer asserted her fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination and the attorney/client privilege as
a bar to enforcement. The Supreme Court held that this could not be a
direct violation of the taxpayer's right against self-incrimination because
she was not being compelled to testify or furnish any information. The
documents were being taken from the possession of a third person, her
attorney.4
7
In discussing the availability of the attorney/client privilege as a bar to
enforcement of the summons,48 the Court stated that the taxpayer could
not have asserted the fifth amendment right even if she had been in
possession of the documents. The fifth amendment protects only against
the compulsion of testimonial disclosures. The work papers of her ac-
countant could not be the testimony of the taxpayer because she did not
prepare them. The Court recognized that being compelled to surrender
evidence in response to a subpoena has certain communicative aspects,
in that the taxpayer would have to admit the existence of the documents
sought and possession or control by the taxpayer. However, whatever
communicative value such compelled admissions may have, the Court
stated that they do not rise to the level of testimony and are not pro-
tected by the fifth amendment. The Court reasoned that the govern-
ment does not rely on the surrender of the documents to prove their
existence, because that existence is a foregone conclusion. In addition,
the Court pointed out that it is not illegal to have such documents pre-
pared or to possess them. Thus it cannot be incriminating to admit their
existence or possession. 4 9 The taxpayer was not compelled to authenti-
cate workpapers of her accountant. Production of the papers would
express only that she believed that the papers produced were those
described in the summons; it would not mean that the taxpayer was
vouching for the authenticity of the documents or the truthfulness of
their contents.5 0
Arguably, the taxpayer's personal papers, e.g., his checks, receipts and
other documents prepared by him, are testimonial in nature and hence
protected under the fifth amendment. He was involved in their creation
and necessarily would authenticate them by producing them in response
to a summons.
51
46. Id. at 394-95.
47. Id. at 398.
48. See text accompanying notes 71-81 infra.
49. 425 U.S. at 409-12.
50. Id. at 409, 413.
51. But see opinion of Brennan, J., concurring in result, 425 U.S. at 414.
10
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In Couch v. United States 12 the Court also centered on possession as the
test for fifth amendment protection and affirmed an order enforcing the
summons. However, the Court did state that there are situations in
which constructive possession is so clear or relinquishment of personal
possession is so temporary and insignificant that the fifth amendment
would be violated by compelling a third person to deliver the documents
sought by the summons.5 3 For example, documents placed in a safe de-
posit box should meet the constructive possession test. Unlike materials
turned over to an attorney or accountant, the taxpayer does not surren-
der control over the documents to the bank, but merely limits his own
access to the documents to certain hours. Personal papers turned over to
an employee also might meet the constructive possession test.54
B. Nonconstitutional Requirements for a Summons
In addition to the ability of the taxpayer to challenge a summons
based on the pure fifth amendment approach, the Supreme Court has
held that the Service must meet certain requirements to satisfy the stat-
ute."5 In order to get enforcement of a summons, the Service must
show: (1) that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legiti-
mate purpose; (2) that the inquiry may be relevant to that purpose; (3)
that the information is not already in the possession of the Service; and
(4) that the administrative steps required by the Internal Revenue Code,
if any, have been followed.5 6
In Donaldson v. United States 57 the Court amplified the meaning of the
requirement "that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a le-
gitimate purpose." Legitimate purpose means civil purpose. Where the
sole objective of the summons is to obtain evidence for use in a criminal
prosecution, the purpose of the summons is improper and the district
court should deny enforcement.5 8 However, the Court recognized that
a summons may be enforced even when the information may lead to a
criminal conviction so long as there is a valid civil purpose. The Court
gave two criteria which must be met to demonstrate a valid civil purpose:
the summons must have been issued in good faith, and it must have
52. 409 U.S. 322 (1973). For a discussion of the accountant/client privilege,
see text accompanying notes 91-93 infra.
53. 409 U.S. at 335.
54. In his dissent Justice Douglas pointed out that the effect of Couch will be
to extend protection to the wealthy taxpayer who can afford to hire a full-time
accountant and thus meet the constructive possession test but to deny that pro-
tection to the average taxpayer who must employ an accountant on a part-time,
independent contractor basis. Id. at 342 n.4.
55. I.R.C. § 7602.
56. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964).
57. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
58. Id. at 533.
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been issued prior to the time the recommendation was made to the Jus-
tice Department that a criminal prosecution be instituted. 9
In interpreting the legitimate purpose test of Donaldson, the courts of
appeals have held that a summons may be successfully challenged on
that basis only if a criminal prosecution has been instituted and is pend-
ing at the time the summons is issued or if a criminal prosecution has
been recommended; 60 that the Service is not required to elect between a
civil or criminal case; and that it may pursue both and utilize the in-
formation obtained for the first to advance the second so long as the
recommendation for prosecution is properly timed.6 1  However, the
summons cannot be enforced once any criminal proceeding is actually
pending in which the information obtained might be used, even if that
prosecution is not tax related.62 The validity of a summons is deter-
mined as of the time it is issued, 63 and the burden is on the taxpayer
seeking to prevent enforcement to show that the sole purpose of the
summons is to obtain information for a criminal prosecution.
6 4
59. Id. at 536.
60. United States v. Troupe, 438 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1971). But see United
States v. Lafko, 520 F.2d 622, 625 (3d Cir. 1975). The Third Circuit stated that a
prior recommendation to the Justice Department to prosecute is not the only
permissible basis for a finding that the summons was issued for an improper
purpose. The district court also must refuse to enforce the summons if it finds
that it was issued in bad faith. See also United States v. Wall Corp., 475 F.2d 893,
895 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (if the investigating agent had formed a firm purpose to
recommend criminal prosecution, issuance of the summons would presumably be
in bad faith).
61. United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1973).
62. United States v. Henry, 491 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1974) (drug prosecution).
The Organized Crime Strike Force of the Attorney General's office has a policy
of working closely with the Service in such cases.
63. United States v. Rosinsky, 547 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1977). The Service is-
sued a summons and brought an enforcement action in a federal district court,
The district court ordered enforcement and the taxpayer appealed. At that point
the Service recommended criminal prosecution. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
enforcement order and directed the taxpayer to supply the requested informa-
tion. The fact that criminal charges had been recommended after the summons
had been issued was no bar to its enforcement.
64. United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1975). The evidence must
be very strong to support such a finding. In Zack the same Intelligence Division
agent who sought enforcement of the summons had obtained a search warrant
directed to the same documents one week earlier; the summons even referred to
the warrant. The agent testified that he would have sought another warrant as
part of a criminal investigation then in progress had not the records sought been
transferred to the possession of the taxpayer's attorney. The agent stated that he
believed the records were thus outside the reach of a warrant. The district court
found that there was no legitimate civil purpose and denied enforcement. The
Ninth Circuit stated that no one of the above factors standing alone would sup-
port a finding that the sole object of the summons was to obtain information for
a criminal investigation, but that all of the factors taken together might be suffi-
678 [Vol. 43
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The practical effect of these interpretations is to severely limit the pro-
tection available to taxpayers from these requirements. In effect, they
pose no real restraints on the ability of the Service to use civil means to
advance a criminal investigation so long as it can supply at least the pre-
text of a valid civil investigation. In most situations, the statute will be
useful to a taxpayer seeking to prevent enforcement of an allegedly civil
summons only when the Service makes a tactical mistake and prema-
turely recommends to the Justice Department that prosecution be in-
itiated.
Stronger statutory safeguards might be enacted by Congress, forbid-
ding use of the civil summons once a case has been turned over to the
Intelligence Division for investigation of possible criminal activity. The
courts should interpret such a law as preventing collusion between the
Service's civil and criminal investigation divisions to circumvent the law's
purpose. If this were done, the government would not be unduly ham-
pered in its efforts to collect revenue, but the Service would be pre-
vented from using a tool which the Congress made available for use in
civil audits to advance a criminal investigation.
IV. ASSERTION OF COMMON LAW PRIVILEGES
There are two dimensions to assertion of the common law evidentiary
privileges, such as the attorney/client and husband/wife privileges, as a
bar to the enforcement of a summons. First, these privileges may have a
foundation in the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimina-
tion guaranteed by the sixth 65 and fifth 6 6 amendments respectively.
Second, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that the privileges of per-
sons in federal courts shall be governed by principles of common law as
interpreted by the federal courts in the light of reason and expe-
cient. It then remanded to insure that the district court applied the proper stan-
dard.
To meet his burden, the taxpayer is entitled to investigate the purpose of the
Service in seeking enforcement of the summons. The Fifth Circuit has held that
the taxpayer is entitled to take the agent's deposition before the hearing on the
motion to enforce the summons. United States v. Wright Motor Co., 536 F.2d
1090 (5th Cir. 1976). The court affirmed a dismissal with prejudice granted by
the district court after the agent refused to answer questions put to him in a
deposition concerning the purpose of the summons.
The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that the taxpayer is not entitled to pre-
enforcement discovery, but that the taxpayer must have some opportunity to
substantiate his allegation that the summons has no legitimate purpose. United
States v. Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1975). The court left the
scope of that opportunity to the district courts but indicated that a cross-
examination of the agent seeking enforcement at the hearing would be a permis-
sible method.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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rience.6 7 Before the adoption of the new rules, the circuits were split as
to whether federal or state law controlled the availability of a particular
privilege in federal court.6 8 However, the language of rule 501 and the
comments of the House and Senate committees indicate that privileges
in federal courts are to be based on a common law developed by the
federal courts under a uniform standard and in light of modern reason
and experience.
6 9
In asserting these privileges as a bar to an Internal Revenue Service
summons, it is important to keep the two dimensions separate. Although
they impact on each other, there are problems concerning standing to
assert constitutional privileges, particularly the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, which must be kept analytically dis-
tinct from the assertion of the common law privileges.7 0
A. AttorneylClient Privilege
The Supreme Court has stated that a summons may be challenged on
the basis of the attorney/client privilege. 7 1 However, Fisher v. United
67. FED. R. EvID. 501 provides: "[T]he privilege of a witness ... shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
68. United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1975).
69. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 9 (1974), reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7082-83; S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 11-13 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7051. 7058-
59. See also Gannet v. First Nat'l State Bank, 546 F.2d 1072 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977).
70. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 396-401 (1976); text accom-
panying notes 73-76 infra.
71. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964). Wigmore describes the
attorney/client privilege:
Where legal advice is sought from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose made in
confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected
from disclosure by himself or the legal adviser unless the protection is
waived.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughten rev. 1961) (emphasis and heading
numbers omitted).
It is the substantive matters communicated between attorney and client which
are protected by the privilege, e.g., the attorney normally cannot refuse to di-
vulge the identity of his client. However, there may be circumstances in which so
much about the client is already known that to reveal his identity would be to
reveal a confidence. Id.
In United States v. Long, 328 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Mo. 1971), the court held
that the attorney must indicate the general nature of the work performed ("liti-
gation," "domestic relations," "tax advice," etc.) but that specific factual inquiry
into the communications between attorney and client beyond this was privileged.
The appendix to the case sets out the questions which were propounded to the
attorney and indicates those which are permissible in light of the privilege.
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States 7 2 makes it clear that merely transferring sensitive documents to an
attorney will not bring them under the protection of the privilege. In
order to assert the privilege successfully as a bar to a summons ordering
the taxpayer's attorney to produce documents in his possession, the tax-
payer or his attorney must show that the client himself would have been
entitled to refuse to produce the documents had they been in his posses-
sion.7 3 This means that the attorney/client privilege cannot be used to
prevent disclosure unless the taxpayer himself is entitled to assert some
other privilege which would shield the documents from the Service. In
Fisher the taxpayers incorrectly argued that it would violate their fifth
amendment rights to compel their attorneys to turn over the documents.
The Court held that a person's fifth amendment rights could not be
violated by compelling evidence from a third party in such a situation.7 4
Instead, it stated that the issue was whether the attorney/client privilege
would be violated if an attorney were compelled to deliver documents
which would have been protected by the fifth amendment prohibition
against self-incrimination had the government sought to compel the
client himself to deliver the documents from his own possession. The
Court stated that the attorney/client privilege would be violated in such
circumstances; the Service could not compel the attorney to turn over
documents in such a situation, provided that the transfer was made for
the purpose of obtaining legal advice.7 5  However, in Fisher the Court
held that the taxpayers could not have successfully asserted the fifth
amendment as a bar to the summons had the documents remained in
their possession 7 and ordered the attorneys to comply with the sum-
mons.
77
The Court indicated that this construction is in complete harmony
with the underlying purpose of the privilege, which is to encourage
clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.7 8 The theory is that the
client will not be discouraged from transferring documents to his attor-
ney so long as he knows that the attorney cannot be compelled to release
documents the client himself could not have been required to produce.
The Court stressed in Fisher that the documents sought to be excluded
from the scope of the summons must have been transferred to the at-
torney by the taxpayer or his agent for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice.7 9 This can be a fine distinction in the tax area; the role of the
The attorney must normally divulge fee arrangements with clients. United
States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1974).
72. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
73. Id. at 402-05. See also 8 J. WIGMOmR, supra note 71, § 2307.
74. 425 U.S. at 396-401.
75. Id. at 405.
76. Id. at 414.
77. Id.
78. See note 71 supra.
79. 425 U.S. at 405.
15
Mills: Mills: Fifth Amendment Privilege and Other Protections
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
attorney is often a mixed one of business and legal advisor. The burden
is on the person asserting the privilege to prove that he is entitled to
it.8 0 An attorney may not safely rely on local court rules or statutes
which make particular documents or records privileged if those rules or
statutes do not coincide with the formulation of the privilege as de-
veloped by the federal courts.81
B. Husband/Wife Privilege
A taxpayer may be able to assert a husband/wife privilege in response
to a summons directed to his spouse. Although the authority is sparse,
there are some indications that such a privilege may be recognized at
federal common law. The privilege relating to the marital relationship
may be divided into two categories. First, the defendant in a criminal
case may prevent his spouse from testifying. 2  Secondly, a spouse may
not give testimony concerning confidential communications made to him
by his spouse. The latter privilege is available in civil cases.8 3
Although Stein v. Bowman 8 4 was decided before the modern marital
privileges were clearly developed, it recognized a husband/wife privilege
80. United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1975).
81. United States v. Cortese, 540 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1976). The court refused
to recognize a privilege based on a local state court rule requiring all contingent
fee contracts to be filed with the prothonotary of the court and providing that
those records were impounded and hence not subject to inspection. The court
held that the federal interest in administering the tax law prevailed over the local
interest in monitoring contingent fee contracts. In Gannet v. First Nat'l Bank,
546 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977), the court refused
to recognize a privilege based on a New Jersey statute which provided that the
bank records of an attorney's trust account will not be disclosed over a claim of
attorney/client privilege. Instead the court applied federal common law and held
that the attorney/client privilege is not available to shield bank records from an
Internal Revenue Service summons merely because the records pertain to an
attorney's trust account. The attorney's trust account is sometimes used by clients
to conduct financial transactions anonymously, including the payment of delin-
quent taxes or taxes on illegal gains undiscovered by the Service. See also United
States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1975). A summons ordering an attorney
to produce records relating to his escrow account is not a per se violation of the
privilege.
Neither an attorney nor a taxpayer may rely on a blanket claim of privilege;
the privilege must be raised as to each record sought. United States v. Hodgson,
492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir. 1974). An in camera inspection by a district court
judge of the documents sought to be shielded from the summons may be a pre-
requisite to the successful assertion of the privilege. See United States v. Nelson,
511 F.2d 1132 (4th Cir. 1975).
82. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 66 (2d ed. 1972). In Missouri, it is un-
clear whether the privilege may be asserted by the defendant spouse or only by
the witness spouse. See State v. Frazier, 550 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
83. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 82, §§ 78-80.
84. 38 U.S. 126 (1839). This nontax diversity case did not involve a federal
question. However, the case was decided at a time when the federal courts were
applying federal common law to diversity cases.
(Vol. 43
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based on preservation of the sanctity of the marriage relationship, which
it termed the "best solace of human existence." 8 5  The Court discussed
the common law incapacity of a spouse to testify either in favor of or
against his spouse 8 6 and the need to protect the confidential relations of
the parties, and held that a wife may not voluntarily or under compul-
sion testify against her husband.
8 7
The Sixth Circuit has more recently acknowledged the existence of a
confidential communications privilege in United States v. Brown. 88  The
court stated that the privilege would not prevent a wife from testifying
as to the genuineness of her signature on a joint return or from provid-
ing handwriting exemplars because no confidential communication be-
tween spouses would be disclosed. In United States v. Goldsmith 89 a district
court appeared to recognize the privilege in an action to enforce a sum-
mons seeking to discover assets of the husband to satisfy tax claims. The
court stated that the privilege was not applicable because the questions
asked of the wife did not reach anything confidential or inculpatory to
her husband.
C. Statutory Privileges
Taxpayers have generally not been successful in asserting privileges
based on state statutes as a bar to an Internal Revenue Service sum-
mons. 90 The Supreme Court in Couch v. United States 91 noted that there
is no accountant/client privilege at federal common law and that no state
accountant/client privilege had yet been recognized in federal court. The
Court held that there can be no accountant/client privilege where re-
cords relevant to a federal income tax return are involved in a criminal
tax investigation. There can be little expectation of privacy, the Court
said, when the taxpayer turns the records over to the accountant know-
ing that the accountant must disclose most of the information in the
process of preparing an accurate return or risk personal liability. 92 It is
85. Id. at 132.
86. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 82, §§ 66, 78.
87. It should be noted that this case was decided before the modern marital
privileges were clearly formulated. The Federal Rules of Evidence require the
federal courts to develop a modern federal common law of evidence. See text
accompanying notes 67 & 69 supra. Therefore, the case is probably not conclu-
sive authority on the status of the privilege in federal courts. It is, however, some
indication of the existence of a husband/wife privilege in federal common law.
88. 536 F.2d 117, 120 n.4 (6th Cir. 1976) (dictum).
89. 272 F. Supp. 924 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
90. Missouri recently enacted a statutory privilege for public accountants,
V.A.M.S. § 326.151, Supp. 1978. The privilege applies to communications made
by the client in person or through books or records, to the advice of the accoun-
tant, to his working papers, and to his employees.
91. 409 U.S. 322 (1973). This case was decided before the adoption of FED.
R. EvID. 501.
92. 409 U.S. at 335.
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possible to interpret the Court's holding narrowly to mean that docu-
ments and other materials turned over to an accountant for a purpose
other than preparing a tax return may be protected by an accountant/
client privilege if such a privilege is ever developed in the federal com-
mon law.9 3 In United States v. Schoenheinz,94 a Federal tax case, the court
similarly refused to recognize an employer/stenographer privilege
created by state statute. 95
V. CONCLUSION
The enforcement of the tax laws has presented a number of difficult
problems involving the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.
Clearly, psychological pressure is not enough to trigger the necessity of a
Miranda warning.96 Yet to require the type of custody normally found
in other criminal investigations is to render the procedural safeguards
guaranteed in that case unavailable to most persons subject to a federal
tax prosecution. By the time the taxpayer is taken into custody, the Ser-
vice usually will have all the information it needs.9 7  A redefinition of
"custody" is needed which will give effect to the "freedom of action"
language in Miranda. The cautionary warning described in that case
should be required after the investigation has been transferred to the
Intelligence Division in any situation in which the taxpayer will experi-
ence a significant compulsion to speak out in an attempt to extricate
himself.
The question whether a summons can be barred on the basis of a fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination will center on the elements
of possession and testimonial quality of the information sought by the
Service. 98  The impact of these factors must await definition by the
courts. However, if the availability of the right against self-incrimination
is to remain applicable to criminal tax cases, neither should be defined
narrowly. Private papers of a taxpayer, and particularly those which he
prepares himself for his own use, should be held to be testimonial of
their contents and of their existence.
In the area of common law privileges, the focus will be on the impact
of the new Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and the development of a
federal common law of privilege. An attorney/client privilege will cer-
93. See opinion of Brennan, J., concurring, id. at 337. Note that an accoun-
tant also may be covered by the attorney/client privilege if the work is done for
an attorney, under the attorney's direction, to enable the attorney to render legal
advice. See United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972).
94. 548 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1977).
95. OR. REV. STAT. § 44.040(I)(f).
96. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
97. See Andrews, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Tax Investigations Under Es-
cobedo and Miranda: The "Critical Stage", 53 IOWA L. REV. 1074, 1111-17 (1968).
98. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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tainly be available in some form. Even this privilege, however, may be
narrowed by the requirement that the attorney/client privilege be availa-
ble only when the client would have had another privilege had the
documents remained in his possession. The taxpayer will usually assert
that he would have had a fifth amendment protection against self-
incrimination if his papers had remained with him. Therefore, if the
testimonial requirements of that right are interpreted restrictively, it will
narrow not only the fifth amendment protection but also the attorney/
client privilege.
It seems unlikely that an accountant/client privilege will be recognized
in tax cases. Such a privilege would drastically limit the government's
access to information necessary to enforcement of the tax laws. Docu-
ments in the possession of an accountant may be protected by a fifth
amendment right only if there is constructive possession by the taxpayer
and if the documents have a sufficient testimonial quality.99
Because of the special nature of tax investigations, they provide a con-
venient and perhaps unsuspected vehicle for narrowing fifth amend-
ment protections against self-incrimination. Procedural safeguards are
designed for the standard police investigation. When these rights are
asserted in a tax case, they do not fit. The response of the courts has
been not to widen the safeguards but to narrow the protection; this
trend could eventually spread to other areas of the criminal law and
encroach on constitutional rights in contexts beyond tax cases.
ROBERT J. MILLS
99. Id.; Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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